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Abstract—Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) is trans-
forming the way in which network operators acquire and manage
network services. By using virtualization technologies to move
packet processing from dedicated hardware to software, NFV has
introduced a new market focused on the offer and distribution of
Virtual Network Functions (VNF). Infrastructure Providers (InP)
can benefit from an NFV market by providing their infrastruc-
tures to fulfill demands of end-users that, in turn, acquire VNFs-
as-a-Service (VNFaaS). In this context, solutions that promote
the competition between InPs can lead to lower prices, while
increasing VNF performance to accommodate specific demands
of end-users. In this paper, BRAIN, a blockchain-based reverse
auction is presented to introduce an auditable solution in which
InPs can compete to host VNFs taking into account the demands
of each particular end-user. Such a solution helps reduce costs
involved in VNF’s commercialization and also monetize NFV-
enabled infrastructures. BRAIN is supported by a case study that
provides evidence of the solution’s feasibility and effectiveness. A
discussion regarding blockchain advantages and drawbacks in
this use-case (e.g., , additional costs and time) concludes this
paper.
Keywords – Network Functions Virtualization, Virtual Net-
work Functions-as-a-Service, Infrastructure Supply, Blockchain,
Smart Contract.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) transforms the
way that computer networks are built and operated by de-
coupling packet processing from proprietary hardware mid-
dleboxes to Virtual Network Functions (VNF) running on
standard off-the-shelf devices [1]. Through the use of vir-
tualization technologies in networks, operators can deploy
custom network services composed of VNFs (e.g., firewalls,
load balancers, and routers) to meet specific user demands
and to minimize network disruption. As a consequence, NFV
helps provide service delivery with an accelerated time-to-
market and agility, while reducing both capital and operational
expenditures (CAPEX and OPEX) [2].
NFV has been attracting the attention from both academy
and industry, but not only because of its technological po-
tential, but also because of economic opportunities around
the NFV market, which include the offering, distribution,
and execution of VNFs [3] by third party companies. As
such, NFV also creates new businesses. That includes, for
example, opportunities for service providers to offer VNF-as-
a-Service (VNFaaS) to end-users [4]. In that model, end-users
can quickly contract and deploy VNFs from public/private
catalogs (i.e., marketplaces) to support end-user demands.
Also, VNF developers can profit by announcing their VNF
implementations in marketplaces so that interested end-users
can purchase them. Such marketplaces can be as simple
as only providing VNFs to be downloaded and instantiated
at end-users’ infrastructure, or it can also be as complex
as, besides offering VNFs, providing physical substrate and
lifecycle management of VNFs. Efforts in such a direction
have been made [5] to propose solutions that simplify the
process of VNFs offering, acquisition, and management, thus,
contributing to the broad adoption of NFV, while introducing
business opportunities. However, the research on models to
efficiently host, audit, and improve revenue from VNFaaS and
NFV-enabled infrastructures is still in its early days [6].
Once the end-user acquires desired VNFs, they need to
be deployed in an NFV-enabled infrastructure. If the end-user
does not own a physical substrate to host acquired VNFs, the
user can still choose between hiring generic infrastructures
(e.g., Amazon AWS or Microsoft Azure) or marketplaces’
infrastructures. In both cases, companies expose their services
conditions and prices usually in an open fashion, i.e., any
user can observe the market and pick the more affordable or
suitable infrastructure. Competition, in this case, is open but
rather static: prices are not tailored according to end-users’
demands. This paper argues, however, that the introduction
of strategies enabling real-time, user-tailored competition be-
tween Infrastructure Providers (InP) favors lower prices and
also contributes to the expansion of marketplaces for VNF
while meeting specific demands of end-users [7]. As such, both
established and new InPs can achieve a large audience and
offer their infrastructures by estimating costs based on each
particular demand according to their current business model
(e.g., lower prices for a firewall with larger memory than one
with CPU core demands). To address such issues, a reverse
auction mechanism [8] was proposed, in order to enable an
efficient and flexible approach to support fair and auditable
competition between providers. Such an approach has been
used along the years, for example, by governments to enable
a fair and transparent competition between suppliers.978-3-903176-16-4 c© 2019 IFIP
IFIP Networking 2019 1570512031
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Reverse auction is a helpful tool in the process of choosing
the infrastructure candidate to host a VNF. In a reverse
auction, distinctly from traditional auctions, sellers compete
for buyers, and the auction winner will be the seller that
provides the lowest price for the better-tailored service [9].
Such a strategy allows InPs to monetize their infrastructure
by receiving requests to host VNFs and give a sealed-bid
based on their business algorithms, i.e., InPs can estimate,
based on the VNF’s and user’s demands, the costs and efforts,
according to their configurations, to supply infrastructures and
resources for each request. Hence, after the bidding process,
the auction owner can recommend, based on the best price, the
appropriate infrastructure to host VNFs in order to supply the
request demands. To support and provide trust for such reverse
auctions for VNFs, blockchains and Smart Contracts (SC)
can be employed, since they offer immutable and permanent
records, which allow interested parties to audit and trust
in the data persisted [10]. Thus, an SC can be defined to
describe end-users and VNFs requirements that can automate
and enforce obligations [11] agreed upon by stakeholders (i.e.,
infrastructure providers, end-users, and marketplaces) before a
VNF deployment.
In this paper, BRAIN, a Blockchain-based Reverse Auction
solution for Infrastructure supply in NFV scenarios, is intro-
duced to address the challenge of discovery and selection of
infrastructures being able to efficiently host a VNF regarding
user-specific demands. This solution facilitates InPs’ competi-
tion and allows them to monetize their computational resources
by hosting end-users’ acquired VNFs. End-users also benefit
from lower prices and high availability of heterogeneous InPs
to supply their dynamic demands. Such a solution correlates
aspects of the infrastructure, such as resource availability,
price, and capacity of fulfilling specific end-user and VNF
requirements (e.g., minimum resources, geolocalization, and
maximum latency) to create an SC that allows InPs to obtain
these requirements information and place bids. Based on
this, and after the bidding process, the solution computes
the best candidate infrastructure (in terms of costs) to run a
VNF regarding the criteria specified in the SC. The process
of determining and placing bid values of each competitor,
based on their resources and business models, is also detailed.
Furthermore, relevant information from the auction (e.g., who
contracts and which infrastructure is hosting the VNF) are
stored in a blockchain to maintain the content of the immutable
record of contract clauses (i.e., SC) and to support future
auditing.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Background on blockchain and SCs is presented in Section II.
Related work is reviewed in Section III. Section IV introduces
the BRAIN solution, and architectural details are provided.
Section V presents a prototype designed and implemented to
demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed solution, including
a case study. Finally, Section V draws conclusions and com-
ments on future work.
II. BACKGROUND
Blockchain was initially conceived as a distributed ledger
to be the backbone of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency [12]. How-
ever, its capacity to provide a trustworthy, decentralized, and
immutable records has attracted the attention of both industry
and academia [10]. Blockchain has several benefits, which
include: (i) decentralization, which results in transactions
validation without the need of trusted intermediaries, (ii)
transparency, to everyone observe what is on the blockchain
and thus allowing auditing the records, (iii) immutability,
which represents that once a data has been recorded into the
blockchain, it is almost impossible to be changed without leav-
ing traces, and (iv) high availability, ensured by a blockchain
replication on thousands of nodes in a peer-to-peer network.
Cryptography is key to blockchain implementation. The
blockchain is an ordered list of blocks, where its cryptographic
hash identifies blocks. Each block is chained to the block that
came before it, which creates a dependency between each
block. If an attacker wants to change a data or transaction,
he/she must spend a massive amount of computational re-
sources to change every block back to the beginning of the
chain (i.e., the genesis block). Thus, once a block is created
and appended to the blockchain, the transactions in that block
virtually cannot be changed or reverted. That ensures the
integrity of the data and transactions occurred in a blockchain.
The second generation of blockchains (e.g., Ethereum [13])
implements the concept of Smart Contracts (SC), which are
executable codes that run inside a blockchain to facilitate,
execute, and enforce the terms of an agreement [11]. The
fees involved in SC are lower than traditional systems that
require a trusted intermediary (e.g., approaches based on third-
party regulators). In an SC, data structures and algorithms
can be developed to store information and execute tasks
when the specified conditions are met, such as transferring a
determined value between users as a punishment when any part
of an agreement is not accomplished. Different programming
languages are available to build SC (e.g., Solidity and Liquid-
ity) [14]. The choice of a language depends directly on the
objectives and blockchain support. For example, in this work,
Solidity – a high-level Turing language for implementing SC
– is used because it has been designed focusing on Ethereum,
which is a popular blockchain platform for using SCs.
After being implemented, the code of an SC for Ethereum
is transformed into a stack-based bytecode language code and
executed in an Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Next, the
blockchain users can, for example, interact on the SC via an
Ethereum’s Remote Procedure Call (RPC) server to request
and insert new information. In order to ensure immutable
records provided by the blockchain, every input must be
recorded as a transaction in the Ethereum blockchain. There-
fore, after being recorded, the information can be validated
on the blockchain by interested parties. In such a direction,
SCs can be used to implement reverse auction mechanisms
as proposed in this work, but also to support any solution
that requires trust and automatic execution of contract clauses
without the requirement of all involved nodes trusting on one
another.
The concept of reverse auctions is also important to this
work. Reverse auctions can be described as a real-time com-
petitive bidding process where the buyer sends a request for
quotation and suppliers issue bids according to the buyers’
demands [15]. The winning bidder turns to be the seller
(i.e., provider) that offers the lowest price. Thus, in a reverse
auction, buyers and sellers reverse their traditional roles from
conventional auctions, i.e., sellers react to the buyer’s needs.
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This kind of auction is widely used, for example, by public
sector agencies and companies to find suppliers [16].
III. RELATED WORK
Marketplaces for network softwarization motivate the in-
troduction of new network paradigms. In the context of NFV,
Bondan et al. [6] introduced a marketplace and federated
ecosystem for the distribution and execution of VNFs. Sim-
ilarly, Xilouris et al. VNFaaS [4] proposed an integrated
architecture to provide. Also, D’oro et al. [5] used game theory
in a distributed solution for NFV that accounts for monetary
costs, communication latency and congestion of computational
resources. However, ecosystems to support such marketplaces
demands but also to support efficient business models becomes
imperative.
Although previous work covers important aspects related
to VNFaaS and NFV-enabled business, they do not provide
discussions for accounting, pricing, and resources provision-
ing. Furthermore, infrastructure providers are not yet entirely
included inside any business model. Regarding business op-
portunities, the authors of this paper argue that the broad
deployment of future network architectures based on NFV
depends mostly on the success of resource allocation [17];
several works have been exploring such a problem. Tasiopoulos
et al. [18] presented a resource management framework for
NFV based service function chaining. Similarly, Jakaria et
al. [19] introduced a solution for resource management in
VNFaaS scenarios. Others solutions employed applied artificial
intelligence [20] and queuing network models [21] also to
address the resource issue. Nevertheless, none of them can
be fully applied in the context of future marketplaces because
of their business particularities and demands. Such solutions
focus on optimized management of resources location, but they
do not worry about infrastructure supply regarding the VNFaaS
landscape.
One helpful approach for the NFV infrastructure supply
is the mechanisms for auctions. Several authors have studied
such mechanisms in areas as distinct as economics and com-
puter science. In computer networks, auction mechanisms are
already applied as an enabler to provide competition between
providers to supply distinct technologies (e.g., in wireless
networks [22] and cloud computing [23]). In the context of
NFV, Gu et al. [24] were the first to design an auction
mechanism for the dynamic provisioning and pricing of NFV
service chains in a data center. Also, Zhang et al. [25] proposed
an online stochastic auction mechanism for on-demand service
chain provisioning and pricing at an NFV provider. Both
solutions explore auctions to introduce features for NFV-
enabled networks. However, none of the noticed solutions
focus on end-users particular demands, on specifications of
each VNF (e.g., information available in such descriptors),
nor in providing reliable records about such auctions and the
stakeholders’ behaviors.
In such a direction, several works advocate in favor of
blockchain and its positive impact on society and industry
[26] by providing a trustworthy, decentralized, and permanent
data storage. Few solutions have been exploiting blockchain
to tackle NFV issues. In one of them, Alvarenga et al. [27]
proposes a blockchain-based architecture for secure manage-
ment, configuration, and migration of VNFs. That work is part
of an open source project [28] for providing safe chaining
of VNFs by using blockchain. In another context, Scheid et
al. [29] used SCs for automatic Service Level Agreement
(SLA) compensation in NFV-enabled networks. Other NFV
issues such as accounting, resource allocation, and pricing of
VNFs have not been addressed yet. Besides, no work examines
blockchain and SCs as business models enablers for NFV
scenarios.
IV. DESIGN OF THE BRAIN SOLUTION
The new blockchain-based reverse auction solution pro-
posed (i.e., BRAIN), uses SCs to provide competition and
reliable records. Such records contain agreements between
end-users and InPs during the auction and even bids’ history.
Thus, end-users can benefit from lower prices, while InPs can
offer their infrastructure for a broader audience. One feature
provided by such solution determines a straightforward path to
integrate it with generic marketplaces. To employ such a so-
lution successfully, few components should be inserted inside
VNFs catalogs, while the remainder of the solution is running
in a distributed way. Basically, marketplaces need to implement
a parser to create SCs regarding available information and run
a component to control the auction (i.e., auctioneer).
BRAIN explores the concept of the English reverse auction
[30] to define how bids are processed. Bidders place their
bid in a sealed envelope and simultaneously hand them to
the Auctioneer. Envelops are then opened and the bidder
with the lowest bid wins, paying the amount bid. Based on
this, concerning a VNFaaS scenario, InPs will send their bids
without knowing the amounts placed by other bidders. All of
such bids will be recorded in the SC, which will reveal the
winning bid only when the auction ends. At the conclusion of
the auction, the information about the auction will be available
to the other bidders for audition purposes. Such reverse auction
is supported by a blockchain implementation that guarantees a
joint trust assumption between InPs and end-users. Therefore,
each bid is processed as a blockchain transaction from the InP
to the SC defining the correspondent auction.
Figure 1 presents the architecture of the BRAIN solution.
White boxes represent optional components that should be
implemented by marketplaces or InPs that desire to use the
proposed auction solution, while the dark gray boxes highlight
the BRAIN components. The NFV broker the entity that
manages and offers VNFs. Thus, current marketplaces can
be viewed as a broker implementing the auction components
inside of their architecture to support BRAIN. Additionally, ev-
ery candidate NFV-enabled infrastructure is implemented fol-
lowing the European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI) standards [31] for NFV management and orchestration.
Thus, InPs in such approach are able to host VNFs and end-
users to sustain their demands when renting/deploying VNFs,
since own infrastructure is not available. In addition, this may
simplify VNF deployment after the auction conclusion, the
chosen InP is aware of the VNF configurations, and code can
be quickly deployed to offer the service according to end-user
preferences.
The flow of the architecture is described as end-users
access a catalog (i.e., marketplace) firstly and acquire a VNF.
Next, priorities defined by end-users during the acquisition
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Fig. 1: BRAIN Architecture
process and requirements of the selected VNF are sent to be
processed by the SC Creator. Then, the SC Creator processes
the information received and creates an SC according to
the specifications. After its creation, the SC is sent to the
Auctioneer, which deploys the SC in the blockchain and
communicates the InPs, via an interface provided by the Bid
Manager, that an auction is opened. In addition to establishing
communication, the Bid Manager also implements algorithms
that will issue automated bids according to their configuration
and the infrastructure status (e.g., resources available and
costs). The Auctioneer can send a command to the SC to
finish the auction and return the best bid. Finally, after knowing
which is the best infrastructure, the Auctioneer forwards it to
the marketplace and the process of VNF deployment can be
started as implemented in the NFV Broker.
A. Smart Contract (SC) Creator
The SC Creator component is in charge of mapping VNFs
requirements and end-users’ priorities into an SC format that
is deployed in a blockchain to be available for InPs to obtain
information related to the auction and bids issued. After the
definition and creation of the SC, it is forwarded to the
Auctioneer to move on with the deployment and the auction
call phase.
The creation of the SC takes into account information
extracted from two description files: (i) VNF Descriptor
(VNFD), describing a VNF with regard to its deployment and
operational requirements (e.g., minimum resources), and (ii)
Priorities Descriptor (PD), a JSON file that is generated by
the NFV broker to describe the particular conditions defined
by end-users, e.g., contract time, additional resources, and
geolocalization preferences. VNFD follows the ETSI standard
[31], while the concept of PD files is proposed here as a JSON
file representing these particular priorities of the end-user.
The SC provides functions that can be called by InPs to
obtain information and submit bids. In the same way, the
Auctioneer can terminate the auction, knowing which is the
address in the blockchain (i.e., InP address) and also what
value of the bid won the auction. Table I presents an overview
of each function available to interact with the SC. In addition to
its parameters and data returned, each function is also classified
in terms of being payable or not, which describes whether
there is a monetary cost to call the function (i.e., payable) or
not according to what is defined by the blockchain (e.g., get
functions are free of charges by default to obtain information
from the auction).
TABLE I: Overview of smart contract functions
Call Parameters Payable Data Returned
submitBid
SC address
bid value
bidder address
Yes -
getInfo SC address No
VNF name
VNF type
VNF developer
Contract period
getResources SC address No
Memory
Disk
CPU cores
getPriorities SC address No
Additional memory
Additional disk
Additional CPU cores
Latecy max
Packets per second capacity
getWinner SC address No Bid valueWinner bidder address
Two address parameters are required to execute the oper-
ations. An SC address is a unique ID identifying the contract
and its information. InPs must also have a bidder address of
the blockchain to issue auto-signed bids. Such addresses are an
SHA-256 hash format generated from a cryptography public
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key representing one address inside the blockchain. Thus, in
each auction, all bids and information will be securely recorded
inside the blockchain for decisions related to auctions or future
audition. The information returned by each function presents
end-users’ demands that were transformed into an SC. All
related information is extracted from descriptor files provided
by the marketplace. The VNF type and contract period, for
example, are to be defined during the VNF acquisition inside
of a PD file and can be used by InPs to promote discounts
(e.g., one month contract for a Firewall can benefit from a price
reduction). VNFD can be available inside the VNF Package
representing each VNF offered within the catalog.
Besides minimum resources, additional resource requests
and specific capacities (e.g., processes determined number of
packets per second) can be described inside PD files to ensure
that the VNF will support periods with a highly unusual
demand. Further, a maximum latency can be defined to enforce
that only InPs with a low latency will be able to provide the
infrastructure. It is important to highlight that the SC Creator
can deal with any information in a JSON format. Based on this,
descriptors can be extended to provide additional information
to be used during bid decision.
B. Auctioneer
The Auctioneer is the component responsible for support-
ing the communication between InPs and the SC. It announces
to interested InPs that an auction is open and also decides
when the auction will be finished based on the previous
configuration. The Auctioneer must know the communication
interface (i.e., RESTful API) of each InP during the call phase.
Such an address can be stored and accessed using two different
models: (i) a database maintained by the NFV broker (e.g., a
marketplace for VNFs), where InPs can register for free to
participate in the auctions, or (ii) a database of infrastructures,
where InPs need to pay a fee to be part of these auctions.
In the case of (i), the operational costs of the auction should
be absorbed by the NFV broker mainly, while (ii) allows the
Auctioneer to make revenue.
After knowing the communication interface of InPs can-
didates, the Auctioneer sends the SC address and the respec-
tive Application Binary Interface (ABI) to the Bid Manager
running on the InP side. Either, the Bid Manager can issue
information requests (see Table I) or submit bids as auto-signed
transactions that will be sent to the SC via an RPC server
provided by the blockchain. It is also important to highlight
that the Auctioneer component can deal with a large number
of SCs at the same time. Different auctions can be identified
by their unique SC address allocated within the blockchain.
Each SC created has three distinct phases that describe the
Auctioneer’s behavior along the time.
1) Opening and Call: The auction starts when the SC is
deployed into the blockchain. Henceforth, the call phase is
defined as the period in which the Auctioneer announces to
each InPs that an SC is available to receive bids. Such an
announcement can be directed to selected candidates or sent
as a broadcast announcement. It only depends on the business
model defined by the marketplace.
2) Bidding Phase: The bidder requests the auction in-
formation via RPC server and issues its bid. Then, the SC
compares the bid with the current best bid, thus detecting that
a new best bid is received and who is the bidder. If a bidder
is not able to provide a bid (e.g., based on a blacklist), the SC
will automatically revoke it. During this phase, the competitors
do not know how many providers are issuing bids nor the value
of their bids.
3) Closing and Decision: As the Auctioneer is the owner
of the SC, it is also in charge of terminating the auction after
on a predefined period (e.g., time, a minimum number of bids,
or a price goal). Such a request is recorded as a transaction
in the blockchain to the SC address and defines the auction
as closed. Finally, the winner is revealed by the SC, and such
information is sent to the NFV broker to proceed with the VNF
deployment process.
C. Bid Manager
The Bid Manager runs inside each infrastructure and
provides a RESTful API for receiving information when a
new SC is available. The Bid Manager can make RPC calls
to the SC interface, requesting for information (e.g., minimum
resources and priorities) and mapping the data returned to be
used as input to the bid calculation.
A bid algorithm implemented as part of the Bid Manager
is responsible for calculating and issuing the bid according to
business variables. It maintains crucial business information
such as price per unit of each resource, discounts for additional
resources, and which type of VNF are considered a business
priority (e.g., some InPs can have optimized infrastructures to
host firewalls). InP should configure all of such information
according to its business directions. If one infrastructure has
sufficient memory available, for example, it will reflect a lower
value for memory in bid calculations.
The current bid algorithm supports three contract periods
that can be specified inside the PD file. In this way, special
prices can be defined for different contract periods of time.
These periods are described as: (i) hour to contract less than
24 hours, (ii) day to contract greater than 24 hours but less
than seven days, and (iii) week that represents each period
larger than seven days. The bid algorithm calculates the final
bid integrating risks and advantages of the contract (e.g.,
contracts with higher periods are most attractive to some InPs)
according to infrastructure policies and business models. As
mentioned before, customizations can be made in the bidding
algorithm according to InP preferences. In such a direction,
an InP can also implement its bid algorithm. Thus, such an
implementation only should be able to make RPC calls to
obtain information and issue bids to the SC interface.
After bid calculations, each bid is auto-signed by the InP
with its private key and the signed transaction is sent to the
SC. Thus, one bid cannot be repudiated by an InP, and contract
clauses can be executed to punish the InP that do not meet
the agreements (e.g., pay a reward or be added in a blacklist).
Always, all bids are recorded inside the SC and can be audited
to validate the competition. Arbitrary users can see the history
of the auction containing bids and each bidder address to
understand how the winner was decided. It is important to
mention that the data flow is the same to sustain multiple users
requests. Thus, a new SC has to be created to address each
user request separately.
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V. PROTOTYPE AND EVALUATION
A prototype was implemented to demonstrate the feasibility
and effectiveness of the BRAIN solution. The code for the
SC Creator, the Auctioneer, and an example of an algorithm
to calculate the bids are available online [32], including
examples of the PD file and SCs. The Python programming
language was chosen in its latest version 3.7.1 to implement
the auction. This decision was due to the possible support
of multiple programming paradigms and focuses on code
readability. The development integrates well-defined libraries
to deal with blockchains and SCs. Flask 1.0.2 was used to
implement the RESTful APIs supporting the communication
between components.
The Ethereum blockchain platform runs an SC written in
diverse languages [13]. SCs were coded using Solidity 0.4.24,
Ethereum’s contract-oriented programming language. In order
to validate such implementations, the Ganache Framework in
its latest version was configured and executed to simulate the
blockchain where the SC will runs. It allows for the creation of
a development blockchain to run tests, to execute commands,
and to inspect states. Ganache itself provides the RPC server.
Thus, a behavior similar to the Ethereum blockchain and its
operations can be emulated to support calls from all auction
components. The case study scenario applies five 20 byte
addresses, which were generated in Ganache to be allocated to
distributed InPs. One address is automatically generated when
an SC is deployed in the blockchain. Every call and transaction
can be executed in the Ethereum blockchain through functions
implemented in the SC. This case study considers a public
catalog of InPs, which allows InPs to register without fees to be
part of auctions (i.e., the Auctioneer does not make revenue).
1 function getInfo() public constant returns (string,
string, string, string) {
2 vnf_name = "Firewall";
3 vnf_type = "Security";
4 vnf_developer = "Muriel Figueredo Franco";
5 contract_period = "month";
6 return (vnf_name, vnf_type, vnf_developer,
contract_period);
7 }
8
9 function getResources() public constant returns (int,
int, int) {
10 int mem = 4;
11 int disk = 2;
12 int cpu = 2;
13 return (mem, disk, cpu);
14 }
15
16 function getPriorities() public constant returns (
string, int, int, int, int, int) {
17 country = "Any";
18 int additional_memory = 0;
19 int additional_disk = 0;
20 int additional_cpu = 2;
21 int latency_max = 20;
22 int packets_per_second = 0;
23 return (country, additional_memory,
additional_disk, additional_cpu,
latency_max, packets_per_second);
24 }
Listing 1: Functions used by InPs to request information from
SCs
There are three main functions available inside the SC that
allows InPs to obtain user requirements information. The code
of these functions, as presented on Listing 1, defines getInfo(),
which returns information related to the VNF development and
the contract period. In another function, details on resources
specified by the VNFD of the acquired VNF can be accessed.
Such a function is getResources() and it returns the memory
RAM (GB), disk usage (GB), and CPU cores required. Finally,
getPriorities() returns customized configurations required by
the end-user. Thus, end-users’ particular demands include
specific country requests in which the VNF must be deployed
or additional resources that must be available to supply high-
demand periods.
InPs can also submit via submitBid(bid value) to the RPC
server. This call must be sent as a signed-transaction to be
officially processed by the SC. Hence, the InP will calculate
its bid value and send it to the SC. The SC will receive
such a value and with the address of the InP that signed the
transaction. The SC will compare the value of the bid with
the current best bid. If the new bid is lower, the best bid will
be updated with the new bid and the address of the InP that
signed the bid. Thus, the SC will maintain the best bid value
and the owner of the bid. These variables can be retrieved
by the Auctioneer, when the auction terminates. For auditing
purposes, each change in the best bid is persisted inside the
blockchain. Listing 2 presents the function code performing
the bid submission.
1 function submitBid(uint bid) public returns (bool) {
2 if (winner == false) {
3 if (bid < bestBid) {
4 bestBid = bid;
5 bid_owner = msg.sender;
6 return true;
7 }
8 else {
9 return false;
10 }
11 }
12 else {
13 return false;
14 }
15 }
Listing 2: Function to InPs submit a bid
1 function endAuction() private returns (bool) {
2 if !(winner) {
3 winner = true;
4 }
5 else {
6 return false;
7 }
8 return true;
9 }
10 function getWinner() private constant returns (uint,
address) {
11 if (winner) {
12 return (bestBid, bid_owner);
13 }
14 else {
15 return false;
16 }
17 }
Listing 3: Functions to control the auction
Since an auction starts when the Auctioneer deploys the
SC, the Auctioneer offers two private functions to control and
obtain information about the auction: endAuction() and getWin-
ner(). The first function (cf. Listing 3) changes a boolean
variable responsible for defining whether there is a winner
(when true) or that the auction is still open (when false). Hence,
the Auctioneer can be in charge of invoking a function when
the auction should be terminated, or it can be implemented
to follow a policy to automatically terminate the auction (e.g.,
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based on time or bid values). Finally, the getWinner() function
can be called to return the value of the best bid and also the
blockchain address of the InP that gives the lower bid.
A. Case Study
Let us suppose a marketplace that provides a Web-based
interface, where the end-user can interact with a catalog of
VNFs. The end-user decides to acquire and instantiate a
VNF, but he/she does not operate his/her own NFV-enabled
infrastructure. Such a marketplace concept is similar to the
one found in literature [6]. Hence, one customer (i.e., end-
user) wants to contract for more than one month a VNF that
implements a state-of-the-art firewall, which is available to
be purchased in the marketplace. The desired VNF has a
descriptor (i.e., VNFD) defining as minimum resources for
the firewall the following: 4 GB RAM, 2 GB disk space,
and 2 CPU cores. Additionally, the end-user requests two
additional GB of memory to be used only in unusually high
demand periods and also defines a maximum latency of 20 ms.
With such information, the contracted VNF is instantiated in
an NFV-enabled infrastructure. Thus, the marketplace should
know which is the best infrastructure available that supports
these demands and provides a cost-efficient solution. For this,
the BRAIN solution is executed.
UFRGS ETH UFSM UZH 
Marketplace
SC creator
Auctioneer
R
PC
 s
er
ve
r
REStful API
Ganache Platform
Accounts
Blocks
Transactions
Smart Contracts
End-user
Bid/Info Bid/Info Bid/Info Bid/Info
Fig. 2: Case Study Scenario
After VNF acquisition by the end-user via the marketplace
(cf. Figure 2), an SC is created by the SC Creator component
based on the VNFD (provided by the marketplace) and end-
user particular demands that were defined during the acquisi-
tion. After that, the Auctioneer identifies, based on a database
request, that there are four infrastructure candidates available
to supply the VNF demand. The Auctioneer deploys the SC
inside the blockchain and sends the SC address to each InP
via the RESTful API. Thus, they can obtain information about
the end-user request and also issue bids based on their own
algorithms. Table II presents the information defined in the
PD file, which represents priorities previously indicated by the
end-user. Note that only the contract period input is mandatory,
other fields are optional for users. Besides this information,
the VNFD containing the description of the network service
is used as an input to the bid calculation as well.
TABLE II: Priorities defined by end-users in PD file
Parameter Value Required
Contract period weekly Yes
Geolocalization preference South America and Europe No
Additional CPU +2 core No
Additional memory +2 GB No
Additional disk space +20 GB No
Maximum latency 10 ms No
Traffic supported 10.000 packets/s No
The bid is calculated by using a customized algorithm that
is part of the Bid Manager and runs inside each infrastructure.
This algorithm obtains information from the SC and calculates
the final bid based on resources required, VNF type, and end-
users priorities (e.g., maximum latency and geolocalization).
Each one of these InPs has its algorithm configured with
actual values. Thus, based on the input containing information
from the auction, an output with the final bid is provided and
recorded on the blockchain. Finally, the Auctioneer sends a last
transaction to the SC in order to terminate the auction. Hence,
the final bid and auction winner is revealed to the marketplace,
and the process continues with the deployment of the VNF.
TABLE III: Infrastructure Providers Overview
Provider Country Free Resources Final Bid
University of Zurich (UZH) Switzerland
40 CPU cores
128 GB memory
15 TB disk
$49.22 USD/month
Federal University of
Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) Brazil
20 CPU cores
3 2GB memory
1 TB disk
$43.63 USD/month
Federal University of
Santa Maria (UFSM) Brazil
4 CPU cores
16 GB memory
1 TB disk
$55.02 USD/month
Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology (ETH) Switzerland
5 CPU cores
32 GB memory
2 TB disk
$59.18 USD/month
Table III shows each candidate InP and their available
resources. The value calculated for each bid algorithm is
shown, while UFRGS and UZH provide lower prices to supply
VNF demands. These lower prices are due to the number
of resources available and their cheaper operational costs
(e.g., infrastructure optimized to deal with firewalls with high
demands) to host the VNF. Note that it is not guaranteed
that the infrastructure with more resources will provide the
best price. The final bid depends on several factors that
can be defined inside the bidding algorithm, presenting the
business model. In such a case, UFRGS provides the best bid.
Therefore, the Auctioneer will let the marketplace know the
bid value and the UFRGS address of the blockchain. Thus,
the communication between the marketplace and UFRGS to
effectively deploy the VNF starts. UFRGS has to deliver the
promised performance and resources; if that is not delivered,
mechanisms to punish such an InP can be defined based on
the SC (e.g., compensations or reputation decreased).
B. Discussion
Despite the benefits introduced by BRAIN, drawbacks
have to be considered when deploying such a solution. The
drawbacks are mainly regarding additional fees and time. The
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fees are not high but should be considered in order to deploy
the auction into a large scale. An analysis of the current state
of Ethereum blockchain was conducted to investigate costs.
For this, Gas used was calculated by each auction call, and it
was analyzed regarding the Gas price and average time. Gas
defines the internal pricing to run a transaction or a contract
in Ethereum blockchain, which is efficient to measure the
computational usage in terms of monetary costs (e.g., Gas per
United States Dollar or Swiss Franc).
The deployment of the SC requires two minutes to be
mined by the blockchain and the cost is US$0.59, which must
be paid by the Auctioneer during the opening and call phase.
The time can be decreased to 40 seconds but the fee to deploy
it in the blockchain is US$1.51. On the InPs side, there is a
cost of US$0.37 to submit a bid. This value should be paid by
each bidder to participate in the auction and guarantees that
the bid will be processed in at least 40 seconds. There is no
significant additional cost and time to handle the requests for
resources and priorities information.
Based on the time that a transaction requires to be pro-
cessed (i.e., mined) in the blockchain, the auction time is
more than 2 minutes. Thus, such additional time should be
considered by the marketplace to avoid a negative impact in
the end-user’s experience nor during the VNF deployment
phases. BRAIN can be used to supply a large variety of
services based on VNFaaS. However, since the blockchain
cannot achieve real-time transactions, there are specific sce-
narios (e.g., hosting VNFs to mitigate imminent cyber attacks)
where other approaches should be considered to reduce the
deployment time. Solutions could try to reduce costs (e.g.,
Gas usage optimization) and also the time required for the
auction. Moreover, according to the evolution of blockchains
and the next-generation blockchains, new opportunities can be
expected to deal with such issues. The authors are researching
the viability of Distributed Ledger Technology (DTL) solutions
to address such limitations.
Regarding scaling properties of the proposed solution, they
depend on the Ethereum blockchain. The number of providers
that can participate is as large as an SC can support according
to the current state of the blockchain, which is, basically,
limited by the max Gas per block on Ethereum. In addition,
the number of transactions secured on the Ethereum blockchain
and, consequently, inherited by the proposed solution, is close
to 20 transactions per second. It is important to mention
that the availability of resources announced by InPs can be
forged, because the solution cannot provide trust due to the
monitoring system, thus, it is not possible to validate monitored
information yet.
Payment issues are out of the work scope. However,
BRAIN was designed in a generic manner in order to be
integrated with innovative payment methods that address the
auction phases and also a VNF billing. Automatic payments
can be implemented by using the Ethereum cryptocurrency
Ether. To this end, the payment can be processed inside the
blockchain and transactions containing the respective value can
be done between distinct wallets (e.g., end-users pay directly to
InPs). Monitoring tools (e.g., blockchain-based SLAs monitors
and malicious behavior detectors) can be helpful to measure if
stakeholders (i.e., end-users and InPs) involved in the auction
are complying to contract clauses, thus, executing the full
payment or applying monetary penalties to the parties that not
follow the deal, e.g., when an InP promises to host a VNF
with a specific requirement that cannot be achieved by using
the provided infrastructure.
VI. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presented BRAIN a solution that introduces a
reverse auction mechanism and fosters the competition among
InPs to supply infrastructures to host VNFs acquired by end-
users. BRAIN builds on blockchain-based SCs to provide trust
to all stakeholders involved and to handle bid submissions.
Moreover, it explores aspects related to ETSI standards (i.e.,
VNF descriptors) and proposes a way to create SCs to request
an infrastructure based on end-users preferences and demands.
Thus, InPs can be aware of requirements and can issue bids ac-
cording to their capacities (e.g., resources available and costs).
This solution provides immutable and trustful records about
each interaction between InPs, marketplaces, and end-users.
This allows for a trust, fair, and auditable auction. In summary,
the contributions of this work include: (i) the technical basis for
a lucrative competition-based business model for NFV-enabled
infrastructure providers, (ii) a simplified way to end-users to
find the best, in terms of costs and performance, infrastructure
to host their VNFs, and (iii) a trustworthy agreement between
stakeholders (i.e., end-users and InPs) regarding resources
contracted and configurations required.
The feasibility of the solution was evaluated in a prototype
implementation and the dedicated case study discussion. The
scenario discussed four InPs competing to supply a VNF
acquired by the end-user via a marketplace. It starts with
the deployment of an SC based on the VNFD and custom
information provided by the end-user. InPs provide their bids
without knowing other competitive bids. The winner is the InP
that provided the lower bid to host the VNF while meeting
the defined demands. The evaluation was also conducted
concerning the practical application of the solution. Based on
this evaluation it was found additional costs to the Auctioneer
for the SC deployment and also for each InPs issue bids. Also,
the time increased by the auction are about 2 minutes according
to the experiments performed. These additional costs and
time can be absorbed both by marketplaces and InPs without
significant losses on their profits and performance. However,
specific scenarios may require real-time performance, where
approaches to optimize the auction must be investigated.
Future work includes: (i) the proposal of a new algorithm
based on the immutable records provided to deal with the
placement and migration of VNFs, (ii) investigation of machine
learning techniques to predict the behavior of InPs and their
bids during the auction, (iii) design and development of a
reputation and compensation system for stakeholders involved
in the reverse auction, and (iv) conduction of studies related
to the economic impact of BRAIN. Finally, other distributed
ledger technologies will be investigated to address limita-
tions discussed in this work. In addition, further real-world
evaluations will be conducted to demonstrate benefits and
drawbacks of BRAIN in terms of performance, scalability, and
robustness.
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